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Beyond the Logic of Solidarity as Sameness: The Critique of Animal Instrumentalization in Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing* and Marian Engel's *Bear*

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The question of how to stand in solidarity with the animal and respect its "divergent agency" (Plumwood 201) without instrumentalizing it as an extension of the human self is one that has long preoccupied Canadian writers. In her seminal work of literary criticism *Survival*, Margaret Atwood observed that Canadian literary texts often rely on images of suffering animals as symbols of Canada's status as a "nearly-extinct" nation threatened by American imperialism (*Survival* 95). According to Atwood, such representations are driven not by a genuine concern with conservation ethics or animal agency but by a compulsion to police the integrity of the national self against external cultural others. In *Surfacing*, Atwood ironizes this logic of incorporation through the figure of a nameless narrator who attempts to consolidate her individual and national selfhoods by aligning herself with animal figures whom she regards as victims of American imperialism. Confusing human–animal solidarity with human–animal sameness, Atwood's narrator eventually feels herself morphing into an animal. Her transformation is ironized, however, by revelations of her own complicity in the colonization and exploitation of the very animals with which she identifies. Marian Engel's *Bear* similarly dramatizes

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the dangers of confusing human–animal solidarity with human–animal sameness, highlighting the political and ethical implications of this instrumentalizing logic: the protagonist's identification with the title character of the novel, Bear, often borders on a dynamic of indigenization that echoes troubling episodes of Canada's settler–invader history.

This paper historicizes Atwood's and Engel's representations of animality by situating them within the context of 1970s nationalist discourses that instrumentalized animals in the service of settler–invader fantasies of both national belonging and national individuation from the United States. I argue that these seminal Canadian novels challenge such discourses by employing the boundary between the human and the animal as a site from which to disrupt Canada's national imaginary, uncovering the instrumentalizing and indigenizing logics that often lie beneath the nation's environmental ethos. I further argue that, by criticizing this instrumentalizing tendency in Canadian national discourse, these novels open up a space for a more ethical acknowledgement of animal others, one that resonates with recent calls, by posthumanist theorists like Cary Wolfe and Donna Haraway, for stories that highlight the subtle material interactions through which humans and animals construct common worlds while maintaining their irreducible differences (Wolfe 35; Haraway, *CSM* 25).

Published in 1972 and 1976, respectively, *Surfacing* and *Bear* appeared in the wake of a wave of Canadian cultural nationalism fueled, on one hand, by the Centennial celebrations of 1967, and, on the other, by the growing anti-Americanism generated by the Vietnam War and the perceived rise of American cultural imperialism in the postwar era. This was also a period of intense debate over the politics of difference within Canada itself. The rise of Quebec separatism and of the Aboriginal rights movement, along with the increasing politicization of the country's burgeoning immigrant constituencies, disrupted the Anglo-Canadian nation-building project (Mackey 63). These external and internal cultural forces coalesced to underscore, more pressingly than ever before, the need for Canadians to develop a unified and distinct sense of themselves as a nation. Animals played a central role in these discursive efforts to produce a distinctly Canadian consciousness. Indeed, as Nicole Shukin notes, it was precisely during this period that the beaver became Canada's official national symbol, serving as a "tool of affective governance to involve Canadians in a project of national identity building and unity" (3). Drawing on the premise that contemporary cultural discourses often fetishize animals as "substitutes . . . for a lost object of desire or original wholeness," Shukin goes on to argue that the Canadian nationalist project of the

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1970s used the image of the beaver fetishistically to invoke "an organic national unity that in actuality did not exist" (3). By incorporating the beaver's qualities as an indigenous and "innocent" inhabitant of the land, Canada could imagine itself as an organic and peaceable entity that was readily distinguishable from the United States (3–4).

The impulse to instrumentalize the animal as a vehicle for indigenization and national individuation was manifested not only in the official nation-building discourses of the era but also in its literary production, which saw the publication of a number of works that drew on animal symbolism to fill a perceived lack in the nation's historical and cultural consciousness. Indeed, as Margery Fee has noted, this cultural moment was characterized by the proliferation of "romantic nationalist" texts that fulfilled the English-Canadian desire for a connection to the land through "a relationship with an object, image, plant, [or] animal" associated with Indigenous people (16). As Fee explains, this dynamic typically involved a "totem transfer," or the "transfer of something symbolic of the land," usually an animal, "from Native to white" in validation of the white settler's claim to the land (21). In *Fear and Temptation,* Terry Goldie echoes and expands upon Fee's observations surrounding the function of animals as frequent tokens in a "totem transfer" ("Romantic Nationalism" 21) validating the settler–invader's presence in Native land. Goldie argues that Anglo-Canadian settler–invader narratives frequently attempt to justify the settler presence in the national landscape by incorporating the indigenous other, who is "recognized . . . as having greater roots in" the land (14). He further notes that the wilderness quest narrative is one of the most common narrative motifs through which this process of indigenization is enacted. As Goldie notes, within this variant of the romance quest narrative, individuation is persistently conflated with *indigenization*: the character "gains a new awareness of self and of nationality through an excursion into the wilderness" (47) and through "some association with indigenes partly removes the civilization which is seen to be inimical to his or her [belonging]" (47). According to Goldie, one of the most recurrent indigenizing metaphors deployed by such narratives is that of the "indigene-animal" (25). Animals not only embody the Indigene's perceived closeness to nature but, when figured in positions of victimhood, also evoke notions of "doomed races" and "disappearing Indians" conducive to settler–invader fantasies of indigenization. In this sense, the animal supplies a multivalent metaphor that confirms the possibility of capturing the essence of indigenous peoples—their perceived "closeness" to nature—while reinforcing their imminent disappearance.

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Surfacing and *Bear* have both been read as quest narratives that end with an affirmation of the protagonist's identity and connection to the land and employ animal metaphors to fulfill their indigenizing ends. Indeed, Goldie actually identifies *Surfacing* as a paradigmatic example of the Canadian wilderness quest narrative (146), while Margery Fee reads both *Surfacing* and *Bear* as romantic nationalist texts in which the settler subject is able to confirm her belonging in the national landscape through a totem transfer involving animals (16). Such readings might suggest that *Surfacing* and *Bear* function as largely uncritical participants in an economy of representation in which animals are instrumentialized as vehicles for the indigenization of the white settler–invader subject. However, although both novels enact a quest in which the Anglo-Canadian protagonist seeks to become of the land through an association with animals, they ironize and ultimately condemn this impulse, highlighting the symbolic and physical violence that is implicit in this logic of incorporation.

Apart from functioning as vehicles for the indigenization of the settler subject in the romantic nationalist fictions of the 1970s, animals played a central role in the fantasies of Canadian individuation from the United States that dominated Canadian cultural politics during this period. Atwood's own work of criticism *Survival* famously helped to install the animal at the forefront of cultural debates surrounding the relationship between Canada and the United States by advancing the now familiar thesis that the prevalence of animal stories within the Canadian literary canon provided the "key to an important facet of the Canadian psyche": Canadians' sense of helplessness before the growing threat of American imperialism and cultural hegemony (87). Told from the point of view of wounded, captured, and dying animals and emphasizing survival as the driving impulse behind all life, the Canadian animal story encapsulated—according to Atwood—Canadians' understanding of themselves as "threatened victim[s], confronted by a superior alien technology against which [they] fee[l] powerless, unable to take any positive defensive action, and, survive each crisis as [they] may, ultimately doomed" (*Survival* 96). As such, these stories were crucial to the construction of what Atwood would later describe as the "great Canadian victim complex": Canadians' persistent tendency to distinguish themselves from Americans by adopting a stance of innocence, and therefore of moral superiority, vis à vis their Southern neighbors (Gibson 22).

Commenting on Atwood's insistence that, being written by humans, animal fictions must inevitably transform animals into projections of human desires and fears (*Survival* 89), Janice Fiamengo and Gwendolyn Guth have both noted that the author's "survival" thesis

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consigned animals to a purely symbolic function without giving enough consideration to the ways in which animal fictions might acknowledge the irreducible difference of animals themselves (“Animals” 17; “(B)othering the Theory” 35). Neither Fiamengo nor Guth considers whether Atwood's *own* fiction similarly collapses the animal other into a mere symbol of the nation's desires and anxieties. However, elsewhere, in a different context, Fiamengo has made the argument that *Surfacing* exceeds and challenges many of the conceptual limitations of *Survival*, constructing a much “more subtle and complex diagnosis of the settler-invader subject” (“Postcolonial Guilt” 152) than its theoretical counterpart. The same could be said of the novel's treatment of the interaction between the settler–invader subject and the animal other. It is my sense that Atwood's depiction of animals in this text works to disrupt, rather than reinforce, the standard patterns of signification identified in *Survival*, whereby animals are collapsed into symbols for the Canadian national psyche. Although Atwood's narrator does attempt to instrumentalize animals as symbols of her ostensible victimhood vis á vis the threat of American imperialism, her efforts are ironized and ultimately thwarted by momentary—yet profoundly destabilizing—manifestations of the divergent agency of these animal others. As Guth contends in her reading of *Bear*, Engel's depiction of an animal companion who is “neither symbolic nor allegorical” similarly questions the assumption that animal narratives must necessarily rely on a “reification of the animal other” into a “perpetual symbol” (36). Ultimately, by challenging the conceptual framework articulated in *Survival*, these novels open up a space for a self-reflexive interrogation of the relationship between the human and the animal, one that highlights the need for a more ethical recognition of the animals who co-constitute Canada's national ecology.

As I have illustrated earlier, the burgeoning Canadian nationalist project of the 1960s and 1970s relied on discursive practices that instrumentalized animals in the service of settler–invader fantasies of national belonging and national individuation from the United States. Adapting Goldie's framework for understanding the signifying processes of settler–invader culture, in which the indigene is understood as a “semiotic pawn on a chessboard under the control of the white signmaker” (10), we might say that Canadian nationalist discourses of the 1960s and 1970s similarly consigned animals to a semiotic field in which they functioned only as pawns, or empty signifiers, that could be deployed at will to invoke the fears and desires of the Anglo-Canadian subject. While *Surfacing* and *Bear* may seem to operate within the prescribed confines of this semiotic field, they disrupt its standard processes of signification by exposing the impulse to incorporate the

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animal other as inherently violent, as well as deluded in its assumptions of human–animal sameness, and insisting on the need to recognize animal others as divergent, meaning-making subjects in their own right.

One way in which *Surfacing* and *Bear* disrupt the Anglo-Canadian impulse to incorporate the animal other for indigenizing ends is by subverting one of the central narrative tropes upon which this incorporation depends: that of the settler–invader search for familial and national origins. Although both novels have traditionally been read as romance quests "containing a successful search for parallel female and national identities" (Gault 33), recent scholarship has identified many ambiguities in their respective adaptations of the identity quest structure. For instance, Fiamengo argues that, instead of mapping a satisfying journey toward national self-discovery, *Surfacing* enacts the "conflicted subjectivity of an invader-settler culture" ("Postcolonial Guilt" 153) in which the self must remain divided between competing power dynamics and identity claims. Meanwhile, Cinda Gault contends that, although *Bear* invokes the conventions of romance by creating an expectation that its protagonist will successfully domesticate Bear through love, it ultimately subverts this expectation by staging "an eruption of reality that accentuates the dangers posed to [Lou]" (36) by her animal counterpart. Such readings make a strong case that, far from enacting a movement from colonial self-doubt to the discovery and consolidation of a distinct national identity, *Surfacing* and *Bear* prompt a re-evaluation of the key symbols and narrative patterns associated with the 1970s project of Canadian self-discovery and individuation. I wish to add another register to this conversation by suggesting that Atwood and Engel use this re-evaluation as an occasion to interrogate Canada's persistent tendency to instrumentalize animal others in the service of its nationalist aspirations.

In *Surfacing*, Atwood's nameless narrator returns to her childhood home in northern Quebec to search for her missing father. Opening with the line, "I can't believe I'm on this road again" (3), the novel appears to suggest that the narrator is about to embark on a journey to retrieve a lost connection to her past. However, far from feeling at home in the landscape of her childhood, the narrator is immediately overcome with a sense that she has entered a "foreign" territory (7). Initially, she attributes her feelings of displacement to the changes that the region has undergone as a result of recent land development schemes and American encroachment: "Nothing is the same, I don't know my way" (8), she remarks in an elegiac tone as she discovers that the old road to her house has been closed down. The illusion that her homecoming has been thwarted by American encroachment is punctured, however, by uncomfortable reminders of her inherently

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conflicted position as both an Anglophone in Quebec territory and a settler–invader who is implicated in the displacement of the regions' First Nations. For instance, while visiting her father's Francophone neighbor Paul, the narrator is overcome with a “paralysis of the throat” (15), an inability to communicate, which revives the sense of alienation from Francophone culture she felt as a child, when she frequently witnessed her mother's uncomfortable attempts to communicate with Paul's wife (17). The narrator's feelings of displacement grow as she begins to suspect that her claims of belonging rest on the erasure of the indigenous peoples who previously inhabited her family's land. Indeed, although she fails to fully acknowledge her own role in displacing First Nations from the region until much later in the novel, the narrator betrays a latent settler–invader guilt when she is momentarily arrested by the sight of two “darkfaced” children selling raspberries at the local gas station (9). Plagued by reminders of her tenuous connection to the landscape of her youth, the narrator is eventually forced to acknowledge that her previous sense of emplacement was an elaborate “optical illusion” (28) and that she has never really felt at home in this landscape.

Like *Surfacing*, Engel's *Bear* subverts the standard narrative arch of the settler–invader identity quest through its emphasis on the protagonist's conflicted status as an interloper in the northern landscape. Engel's protagonist, an archivist who works for a historical institute, is sent to Pennarth Estate, the country home of the British Colonel Cary, to research the history of early settlement in northern Ontario. In other words, Lou is literally sent to Pennarth to trace an ancestry that might help legitimize settler–invader presence in the area. What she encounters, instead, is an estate library filled with imported volumes that reflect the education and tastes of the typical nineteenth century British gentleman—a finding that prompts her to wonder “where else there would be such a perfect library for this period” (38). Thus, far from providing the key to the “local history” of northern Ontario, as Lou and the director of the archives had hoped, Pennarth figures as a transplanted locus of nineteenth century Britain—the perfect place “to study London in 1825” (46). Even the home itself seems hopelessly at odds with its surroundings: “too elaborate, [and] too hard to heat,” it stands as an emblem of “colonial pretentiousness” in a new world setting (36). Pennarth is haunted not only by traces of British colonialism but also by the threat of American imperialism, as signaled by the revelation that the home was designed by Fowler, the phrenologist and architect who popularized the octagon house design in the nineteenth century, and whom Lou characterizes as “the sort of American we are all warned about” (37). Given that Pennarth is a “classic Fowler's

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octagon" (22), a construction designed to imitate the structure of the human brain, Lou's remarks about its foreignness double as a displaced acknowledgement of her own conflicted psyche as a settler–invader subject with a dubious connection to the land. As the evidence of her status as an interloper continues to accrue, Lou is forced to concede that "Colonel Cary [is] surely one of the great irrelevancies of Canadian history and she [is] another" and that "neither of them [is] connected to anything" (84).

In both novels, the protagonists attempt to resolve their feelings of displacement by aligning themselves with creatures whom they regard as indigenous to the Canadian wilderness. In both cases, this incorporation of the animal other is enacted through the protagonist's self-identification as a victim of gendered and, in the case of *Surfacing*, neo-imperial violence. Rehearsing the common nationalist trope of Canada as a "feminized victim of imperialism" (Mackey 23), Atwood's narrator casts herself as a victim of patriarchal violence and American military imperialism, drawing—sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously—on animal imagery to articulate her feelings of helplessness vis à vis these interlocking systems of domination. Having been socialized from the time she was a child to feel alienated from her own body and sexuality, the narrator frequently draws on animal imagery to express her conflicted perception of her own body as what Hélène Cixous might call an "uncanny stranger on display." For instance, while reminiscing about the sexual health lectures she received in high school, she compares the ovaries pictured in her schoolbooks to "purple sea creatures" (78). But perhaps most significantly, the narrator persistently sublimates her guilt over her unacknowledged abortion by picturing herself as a helpless animal who has been brutally victimized by the patriarchal medical establishment: "they stick needles into you so you won't hear anything, you might as well be a dead pig, your legs are up in a metal frame, they bend over you . . . they take the baby out with a fork like a pickle out of a pickle jar," she states while experiencing one particularly harrowing flashback of the abortion (82).

The narrator's self-identification with suffering animals is amplified by her mounting fear of American imperialism. She sees traces of American encroachment everywhere, accusing American tourists of killing animals wantonly ("[they] catch more [fish] than they can eat and they'd do it with dynamite if they could" [65]), blaming Americans for the intrusive land development and resource extraction schemes underway in the region ("now we're passing the turnoff pit that the Americans hollowed out" [5]), and comparing the influence of the United States to an infectious "disease" that threatens to engulf her home turf and the country as a whole (3). The narrator's self-construction as a victim of

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American encroachment intensifies when, during a canoe outing, she finds a bludgeoned heron dangling upside down from the tree branches. Concluding that the creature was maliciously tortured and killed by American tourists and that the tourists' objective in committing this brutal act was to "prove they could do it, [that] they had the power to kill" (121), the narrator becomes fixated on forestalling what she perceives to be an imminent American takeover and begins to think of herself as an animal in danger of being captured and killed by Americans, the "cross of [their] rifle" aimed at her "forehead" (122).

The narrator's fantasies of animal incorporation are bolstered by her deluded belief that her father has gone missing because he has achieved a mystical incorporation into the wilderness. The narrator sustains this fiction through a changing interpretation of the animal sketches she finds among her father's papers. Noting the human-like qualities of the amphibious creature depicted in the sketches, she initially concludes that these images are evidence of a "hallucination" (105), a vision of "what [her father] thought he was turning into" (105). Later, after finding evidence of her father's correspondence with an academic expert on the rock paintings of the Canadian Shield, she learns that the drawings were actually replicas of a series of pictographs her father found while he was researching the sacred Indigenous sites of the region. However, after diving into White Birch Lake in search of the pictographs and discovering her father's drowned body, the narrator suppresses both the fact of his death and the true origin of his sketches. Thus, she convinces herself that her father remains alive and that his sketches are really the remnants of a "true vision" he experienced before retreating into the wilderness to "discove[r] new places, new oracles" (151). Certain that she is poised to undergo a similar initiation herself, the narrator escapes to the woods and undertakes a ritual cleansing to shed the "wrong form that encases [her]" (189). As she enacts this ritual reminiscent of an Aboriginal spirit quest, she feels herself shedding her human skin and absorbing the spirit of the brutalized heron: "I remember the heron; by now it will be insects, frogs, fish, other herons. My body also changes, the creature in me, plant-animal, sends out filaments in me," she tells us (178). Now fully identifying with the heron, the narrator fears that, if the Americans find her, they will bludgeon and "hang [her] up by the feet from a tree" (195) just as they did with the bird. With her transformation into a suffering animal now apparently completed, the narrator feels as though she has become *of* the land, finally declaring herself to be "part of the landscape" (199).

In *Bear*, Lou's relationship to the title character follows a similar trajectory from identification to attempted incorporation. Like Atwood's

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narrator, Lou is able to align herself with her animal companion through her self-identification as a victim of gendered violence. Indeed, the novel frames the journey to Pennarth as an opportunity for Lou to escape, and hopefully resolve, a long history of abusive relationships: most significantly, her recent involvement with an egotistical and emotionally abusive partner who left her for a younger woman after coercing her to have an abortion (118). There are also some subtle indications that Lou suffered some form of sexual trauma in the past and that this repressed history has led her to identify with Bear as a fellow victim of patriarchal violence. For instance, when Bear's touch inadvertently triggers the memory of a threatening encounter with a casual sex partner who "turned out not to be a good man," Lou reassures herself that she has nothing to fear from her animal companion because they are both profoundly linked by the primal instincts of "fright and flight" (64). Lou's perception of Bear as a fellow victim of patriarchal violence is consolidated when she learns that Bear's predecessor, a bear belonging to the female Colonel Cary, was killed by a hunter who was bent on emulating Ernest Hemingway's hypermasculine exploits (81). Lou's reaction to the story —she "fe[els] herself falling over with a little thud" (118) in a moment of visceral identification with the wounded bear—reflects how deeply she has begun to empathize with her animal companion. Her feelings of identification are exacerbated as her relationship with Bear becomes more and more intimate. Indeed, although Lou is initially content to let Bear explore her body on his own terms, allowing him to smell and lick her at his own will, she eventually begins to crave a total incorporation of his flesh into her own, fantasizing that he will one day "impregnate her with the twin heroes that [will] save her tribe" (121). In short, Lou dreams that Bear will "save" her descendants by endowing them with his indigenous seed, thereby enabling them to become fully of the land.

In both novels, the protagonist's efforts to incorporate the animal other are punctured by revelations of her complicity with the exploitation and colonization of the very wilderness with which they identify. If, as Fiamengo points out, *Surfacing* is more about "what happens when narratives of innocence break down" than it is about "maintaining the oppositions between Canada and America, between an innocent narrator and a threatening outside world" ("Postcolonial Guilt" 147, 151), then this disruption is enacted largely through an unraveling of the many fictions that the narrator tells herself about her relationship to animals. Indeed, the narrator's identification with the suffering heron is repeatedly disrupted by suppressed memories of her passive compliance with her brother's torturing and killing of the various

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animals and insects he used to capture in the forest. The narrator recalls an instance in which she had an opportunity to save the creatures but failed to liberate them and finally concludes that it was "because of [her] fear [that] they were killed" (136). Even looking back to her childhood, then, the narrator is unable to substantiate the assumptions of innocence that inform her self-identification with suffering animals. More pressingly still, the narrator's memories of her brother's animal specimens all seem to lead back to the imprint memory of her aborted child "in a bottle curled up, staring out at [her] like a cat pickled" (148)— a parallel that betrays the unspeakable guilt the narrator continues to feel as a result of her abortion *despite* her constant affirmations of innocence.[1] These claims of innocence are destabilized even further when the narrator re-encounters the tourists whom she has blamed for the heron's death. Not only do the "tourists" turn out to be Canadian but they also reveal that they had similarly mistaken the narrator for an American. This ironic reversal subverts the narrator's assumption that she is readily distinguishable from— and somehow morally superior to—Americans, confirming her latent fear that she, and Canadians more generally, are "sellouts" (137) who have auctioned off their country for economic profit and are therefore fully implicated in the exploitation of its natural resources and wildlife. But the final, most devastating blow to the narrator's claims of innocence—and concomitant identification with suffering animals— comes with the full revelation of her complicity with the displacement and erasure of the indigenous peoples who previously inhabited the land that her parents' cottage now stands on. Recalling these "others who used to come" to the lake and registering a vague awareness that "the government had put them somewhere else," the narrator recognizes, for the first time, that these others "must have hated" her and her family (89). Her admission re-frames her home territory as an internally contested space with a history of violence all its own and underscores her own responsibility in this violence.

In *Bear*, Lou's sense of identification with the title character is punctured by her status as a settler–invader figure who risks reenacting the colonialist project that runs through the various fragments of "bear lore" she finds in Colonel Cary's library. The records move from a scientific classification of the bear family (43), to a description of the Romans' use of bears as instruments of torture (104), to an account of a Japanese ritual involving the brutal garroting of a bear cub originally raised among humans (115). Taken together, these accounts can be read as an ironic commentary on the ethical pitfalls of the settler–invader impulse to incorporate the animal other. Lou is appalled by the documents and wants to protect Bear from the cruel forms of

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abuse described in them, praying for God to "keep him safe from harm" (65). However, we get a strong sense that she is in danger of perpetuating this history of violence when she fantasizes about making herself "strange garments in fur" (113) in order to stay with Bear through the winter and finally asks Bear to "make [her] comfortable in the world at last" by giving her his skin (112).

In both novels, the protagonists' inadvertent unveiling of their complicity with animal oppression works to destabilize their attempts to achieve personal and national individuation by incorporating the animal other. But more importantly, the impulse toward incorporation is abruptly—if not indefinitely—forestalled when their animal counterparts assert their otherness just as the central characters seem poised to accomplish their transformations. The complex relational exchanges that occur during these climactic moments defy the Anglo-Canadian impulse to collapse the animal into a symbol of national self-discovery and individuation and, in so doing, begin to tear at the limits of the semiotic field constructed by nationalist discourses of the 1970s and reinforced by Atwood's own theorization of the animal in *Survival*. Below, I draw on Cary Wolfe's and Donna Haraway's discussions of the relationship between language, materiality, and human–animal relationality to tease out the moments of ethical possibility embedded within these encounters.

In his article "In the Shadow of Wittgenstein's Lion," Wolfe interprets Wittgenstein's memorable assertion that "if a lion could talk . . . we would not understand him" (qtd. in Wolfe 1) as a call to theorize animal otherness in a way that does not project human language and subjectivity onto animals nor assumes that humans are the only ones capable of responding meaningfully to the other. Drawing on Wittgenstein's reminder that "the kind of certainty is the kind of language game" (qtd. in Wolfe 1), Wolfe stresses that language should be conceived not as a representational means of accessing a truth about the world but as a relational "game" constituted by grammatical and syntactical conventions in which the participants are able to "build a shared form of life" by enacting these conventions (5). Wolfe stresses that there is nothing in Wittgenstein's account to suggest that the participants in this shared dynamic necessarily have to be human and finds a productive theorization of human–animal co-languaging in Vicky Hearne's writings, which describe "how the shared language of animal training makes possible a common world between beings with vastly different phenomenologies" (5). However, Wolfe goes on to problematize Hearne's appropriation of Wittgenstein, arguing that, insofar as it depends upon the establishment of common language codes and theorizes these codes largely in terms of human language

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and subjectivity, this framework effectively denies ethical consideration to "those animals with whom we have not articulated a shared form of life through training or other means" (8). For Wolfe, this omission works to erode the ethical possibilities suggested by the "shared common world building with animals," reinstalling a form of humanism that "leav[es] the animal ethically if not phenomenologically bedarkened and the human insufficiently interrogated by the encounter" (6).

Wolfe attempts to provide a corrective against the residual humanism in Hearne's account by considering how poststructuralist theory can help expand our understanding of the semiotic interactions between humans and animals. Most significantly for the purposes of this discussion, he takes up Jacques Derrida's assertion that constructing an anti-anthropocentric ethics has less to do with "'giving speech back' to animals," either by attempting to speak for them or by ascribing human language and subjectivity to them, than it does with *recognizing* the ethical value of their lack of speech (qtd. in Wolfe 23). More specifically, Derrida argues that what makes animals worthy of ethical consideration is not a communicative capacity they share with humans, as Hearne would have it, but rather a shared passivity that rests in their "non-power" to suffer (24). For Derrida, the recognition of this shared "non-power" unveils the trace of the animal that is always already present in the human, thereby eroding the ontological divide between the human and the animal on which humanism is predicated. Wolfe insists that Derrida's account can help us to conceive of the semiotic interactions between humans and animals in a way that challenges the humanist privileging of logos as the basis of all communication. More specifically, he contends that, by eroding the inside/outside distinction between the human and the animal, Derrida's account prompts us to reconceptualize the ostensible "difference in *kind* between human and animal that humanism constitutes on the site of language" as a "difference in *degree* on a continuum of signifying processes" enacted in a "field of materiality, technicity, and contingency" (Wolfe 35). In other words, according to Wolfe, Derrida's intervention makes it possible for us to "theorize the continuities, while attending to the differences" (41), between human language and non-human modes of communication.

Donna Haraway is similarly interested in developing an ethics that attends to the irreducible differences that separate humans and animals while leaving open the possibility of communicating meaningfully across the species boundary. Like Wolfe, Haraway insists that constructing an anti-anthropocentric ethics demands that we attend to *both* the continuities and the differences that exist between humans and animals—or, as Haraway puts it, that we learn to relate with

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animals in "significant otherness" (*CSM* 49). However, in an important departure from Wolfe's framework, Haraway positions her animal ethics in direct contraposition to Derrida's aforementioned assertion that "the *first* and *decisive* question" we must ask ourselves when relating to animal others is not whether they can speak, but whether they can suffer (qtd. in 22). Although Haraway acknowledges the ethical value of considering the question of animal suffering, she argues that a more relevant line of inquiry might be:

> . . . Can animals play? Or work? And even, can I learn to play with *this* cat? Can I, the philosopher, respond to an invitation or recognize one when it is offered? What if work and play, and not just pity, open up the possibility of mutual response, without names, is taken seriously as an everyday practice available to philosophy and to science? (*WSM* 22)

Like Hearne, then, Haraway posits that humans and animals are able to construct common worlds and "look back reciprocally at each other" (27) through their participation in various kinds of play. However, like Wolfe, Haraway rejects accounts that would theorize these interactions in terms of the categories provided by human language and insists on the need to reconceptualize human–animal communication as a process that is enacted through complex interactions that involve sensory—as well as semiotic—means of relating (26). In contrast to Hearne's insistence that human–animal communication must be grounded in the mastery of a predetermined set of linguistic conventions, then, Haraway stresses that humans and animals relate through embodied interactions "in which all the actors become who they are *in the dance of relating*" (25). In other words, for Haraway, the patterns of relating that humans and animals engage in are situated, contingent, and deeply embodied: they emerge from the specific orientations of specific bodies in specific times and places. As such, they demand a constant alertness to the sensory phenomena that result from our attempts to communicate with one another.

Wolfe's insistence—via Derrida—on the need to construct an ethics that avoids the anthropocentric temptation to return speech to the animal and Haraway's suggestion that such an ethics must be grounded in a recognition of the animal's "significant otherness" can help us account for the semiotic disruptions at work in *Surfacing* and *Bear.* It is my sense that much of the symbolic violence implicit in the protagonists' attempts to incorporate the animal other stems from their respective efforts to return speech to animals either by speaking for them (in the case of Atwood's nameless narrator) or by projecting a human

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subjectivity onto them (in the case of Lou). It is also my sense that the animal others in these texts actively *resist* this symbolic violence by affirming their irreducible difference just as the narrators seem poised to complete their respective transformations.

In *Surfacing,* Atwood's narrator frequently attempts to speak for animal others, justifying this impulse by reading animals as speechless entities that are capable of communicating only through biologically programed messages. For instance, in describing the blue jays who inhabit her father's property, she claims that the birds "sing for the same reason trucks honk, to proclaim their territories: a rudimentary language" (Atwood 39). Assuming that she herself is fully in possession of *logos* (a highly questionable assumption given the number of Freudian slips and unassimilated memories that abound in her narrative), the narrator thinks herself capable of translating the calls of wild animals into human language. Thus, she persistently casts herself as a "translator" for the animal world, claiming the ability to interpret the "[s]queaks, shuffling in the dry leaves, and grunting" of the animals around her (129). The narrator's conviction in her own ability to make the animal other speak grows in tandem with her increasing identification with suffering animals. After escaping to the woods to complete her becoming-animal, she claims conversance in the heterogeneous languages spoken by all the animals and animal spirits who inhabit the forest, asserting, at one point, that "in one of the languages there are no nouns, only verbs held for a longer moment" (193). The narrator's claims of sameness with the animal world are disrupted, however, by her troubling encounter, toward the end of the novel, with the blue jays who inhabit her father's property. Not only do the birds hail her as an outsider, meeting her approach with territorial cries of alarm; they also return her gaze by "fixing her first with one eye, then the other" (194) in a scene that recalls her earlier confrontation with the "mashed eye" (148) of the tortured heron. If, in her earlier identification with the heron, the narrator had been able to transfer the blame implicit in the bird's dead gaze to the "Americans" who ostensibly killed it, in this scene, she cannot deny her status as the object of the blue jays' reticent gaze. Confronted by the birds' ability to look back *at* her, the narrator is dislodged from her position of sameness with the animal other and is forced to recognize, along with Derrida, that the animal also "has its point of view regarding [her]" (qtd. in Wolfe 27). Although *Surfacing* fails to transvaluate (to borrow one of Wolfe's expressions) this defamiliarizing encounter into a concrete vision of how humans might relate more ethically to animals, it effectively disrupts the logic of animal instrumentalization by

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lingering in those moments of ethical possibility in which the alterity of the animal other makes itself manifest.

While Atwood's narrator assumes that she can speak for animal others, Engel's protagonist misguidedly projects human language and subjectivity onto her animal companion, establishing what Haraway would describe as a "shared *anthropomorphic* personhood" as the basis of her relationship with Bear ("Otherworldly" 131). More specifically, Lou interprets all of Bear's gestures according to the linguistic conventions and gendered expectations of the Romance genre, collapsing Bear into a non-human version of the kind of assiduous masculine lover one might encounter in a Harlequin romance (here Engel seems to be playing self-reflexively on the novel's beginnings as an erotic tale).[2] After her first intimate encounter with Bear, Lou is gratified to find that he "persevered in her pleasure" like "no human being she [has] ever known" (Engel 93) and interprets this diligence as an indication of Bear's desire to fill the emotional and sexual voids that her previous relationships left behind. Her reading of Bear as a "generous" masculine lover is thrown into question, however, by the androgynous and protean nature of Bear's embodiment. Initially, Bear seems "indubitably male" (35); however, as the narrative unfolds, he takes on increasingly multifarious forms, appearing by turns as a genderless "lump" (34), a "middle-aged woman," a "mesomorphic mannikin" (113), and, finally, a baby (113). Following Haraway, we might argue that Bear's shifting embodiment works to foreground the necessity of remaining attentive to the material-semiotic signals that all actors—both human and non-human—emit "*in the act of relating*" (*WSM* 25). However, instead of remaining alert and responsive to the sensory cues that Bear emits throughout the course of their interactions, Lou clings to her initial perception of Bear as a romantic lover and is filled "with an "extravagan[t]" desire to consummate her relationship with him (Engel 117)." Not surprisingly, however, when Lou finally mounts Bear in an attempt to achieve this consummation, he meets her with complete indifference (122). Following this encounter, Lou realizes that "the quality of her love was different now" and that "there was something aggressive" about her sexual overtures to Bear (122). Although Lou is now starting to develop a vague awareness of the violence implicit in her attempts to incorporate Bear, it is not until she finally presents herself to him "on all fours . . . in the animal posture" (131) that she realizes just how far she has forced the boundary between affinity and incorporation. Here, Bear asserts his reticence to Lou's sexual advances by striking her across the back, leaving a gash that stands as a material reminder of his irreducible difference.

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Lou is not altogether mistaken in thinking that she and Bear have shared some meaningful encounters; she *is* mistaken, however, in reading these interactions through the categories provided by human language while ignoring the subtle relational cues provided by Bear's embodied gestures. Engel stresses the necessity of attending to such cues through the figure of Lucy, the indigenous woman who maintains a longstanding friendship with Bear, and who advises Lou at the beginning of the novel to defecate in close proximity to the animal in order that he may get used to her scent: "Bear lives by smell," Lucy says to Lou in what could be read as an assertion of the semioticity, or meaning-making capacity, that Haraway attributes to "nonlinguistic embodied communication" (*WSM 27*). Following Lucy's advice, one morning, Lou relieves herself in front of Bear but subsequently proceeds to ignore the animal's embodied reactions to her scent:

> . . . The bear, lying with his body inside [the cabin], his head in the sun, moved its nostrils to investigate her scent.
>
> "Come on," she said, when she was finished the humiliating act. "Come on." Tugged at his chain. Unhooked the chain from the post. At first he did not respond; then he got groggily to its feet. When she tugged hard, he padded after her. (Engel 50)

We might argue that, by moving his nostrils in acknowledgement of Lou's scent, Bear has invited Lou to participate in what Haraway would describe as a "mutually responsive" (*WSM* 23) act of relating. However, instead of questioning what Bear may be signaling to her through this subtle gesture, Lou rushes to re-establish logos as the basis of their interaction, yelling at Bear to "come on"—an act of symbolic violence that gets actualized at a material level when Lou tugs impatiently on Bear's chain.

By emphasizing the subtle relational cues emitted by Bear, as well as Lou's repeated failure to recognize the ethical possibilities that are embedded in these cues, *Bear* moves beyond a simple recognition of the irreducible difference of the animal other to identify potential ways in which humans and animals might communicate meaningfully across significant otherness. More specifically, Engel seems to anticipate Wolfe and Haraway's shared insistence that relating ethically to animal others demands, first and foremost, that we conceive of human–animal interactions as *material-semiotic* encounters in which all actors must remain continuously attentive to the embodied cues emitted by the other in the act of relating. This ethical vision remains

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incomplete, at best: if, toward the end of the novel, Lou begins to recognize Bear's irreducible difference, acknowledging that "she had gone too far with him" (122), in the last scene of the novel, she slips back into an instrumentalizing and indigenizing logic, interpreting the gash Bear left on her back as a mark of renewal that absolves her of her latent postcolonial guilt (140). By this point in the narrative, however, Engel has already conditioned us to be highly suspicious of her heroine's misguided readings of Bear's gestures. Thus, Lou's insistence that Bear's claw "healed [her] guilt" (140) stands both as an ironic commentary on the settler–invader impulse to instrumentalize animals and a reminder of the need to develop more competent—and reciprocal—ways of engaging with animal others.

The nationalist discourses that emerged in Canada during 1960s and 1970s relied on symbolic practices that instrumentalized animals in the service of settler–invader fantasies of national belonging and national individuation from the United States. While *Surfacing* and *Bear* may seem to operate within the prescribed confines of this semiotic field, they disrupt its standard processes of signification by exposing the impulse to incorporate the animal other as inherently violent—and, ultimately, deluded in its pursuit of human–animal sameness—and insisting on the need to recognize animals as divergent, meaning-making actors in their own right. Thus, contrary to Atwood's critical assertion that, being written by humans, animal fictions must inevitably transform animals into projections of human "desire or fear" (*Survival* 89), *Surfacing* and *Bear* force a serious engagement with the question of how to relate ethically with animal others—one that anticipates recent calls, within contemporary animal studies, for a closer examination of the subtle embodied interactions through which humans and animals construct common worlds while maintaining their irreducible differences. By way of conclusion, I'd like to consider the specific role that literary aesthetics has to play in imagining more ethical ways of relating to animal others by considering the narrative strategies used in *Surfacing* and *Bear* in relation to the aesthetic concerns raised by Elizabeth Costello in J.M. Coetzee's genre-bending novella and metafictional treatise on animal rights entitled *The Lives of Animals*.

As I have been arguing throughout, *Surfacing* and *Bear* disrupt the instrumentalizing logic implicit in the wilderness quest narrative primarily through irony: both novels invoke, but then overturn, the narrative impulse to incorporate the animal other by revealing the personal fictions and colonial investments that inform their protagonists' identification with suffering animals. However, while this strategy is highly successful in laying bare the cultural and psychological trappings that have traditionally contributed to the instrumentalization of animals

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within the Canadian literary imagination, it is less successful in helping us to imagine alternatives to this anthropocentric logic. What would an aesthetics that engages in interspecies translation without succumbing to anthropocentric temptation look like? What power does literary aesthetics have to imagine animal others without anthropomorphizing them? These are two of the central questions asked by the fictional writer Elizabeth Costello in Coetzee's *Lives of Animals*. Indeed, with its metafictional scaffolding and ambivalent staging of a philosophical debate that affirms the difficulty of resolving the "ethical conflicts" that inform human–animal relationships (Gutmann 8), *The Lives of Animals* can be read as an extended meditation on the limits of narrative irony as a vehicle for fostering more ethical ways of relating to animal others.

Delivered as part of the Tanner lectures at Princeton University, *The Lives of Animals* takes on the form of two "mock-lectures" (Huggan 710) presented by the fictional writer Elizabeth Costello at Appleton University, a fictional college in the United States. As Graham Huggan notes, "the simulated form of the lecture allows Coetzee to reflect ironically on the gap between ivory-tower academicism and real-world social practice while drawing together, at the same time, a number of fictional (literary) and non-fictional (scientific) sources to produce a cannily displaced apologetics for the sympathetic imagination" (710). Elizabeth's lectures revolve around the topic of animal abuse, which she regards as one of the greatest crimes in human history—one that is comparable, in her view, to the slaughtering of Jews during the Holocaust (Coetzee 19–21). Yet despite her impassioned attempts to illustrate the horrific nature of animal abuse, Elizabeth has little success in eliciting her audience's sympathy for the cause of animal rights, in part because her efforts to trace the historical and ideological roots of Western anthropocentrism only serve to underscore "the competing moral and intellectual discourses that surround ecological debates on the exploitation" of animal others (Huggan 710). This ambivalence is exacerbated by the many ironies and contradictions that run through Elizabeth's arguments, a central one being that her "discourse, for all its altruistic sentiment, frequently betrays self-interested motives, not least by offering a confused mixture of liberal do-goodism and Christian eschatology in which the mission to save lives becomes a displaced quest for self-redemption" (Huggan 712). While these ironies carry out the important work of revealing the ideological assumptions that inform human beings' perception of animals, they do little to address the pressing ethical question that lies at the heart of Coetzee's text: how does one move beyond an ironic awareness of the dangers of anthropocentrism to construct interspecies relationships that respect

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animals' irreducible difference? It is in answering this question that, as Huggan points out, Elizabeth's claims "might yet be validated," since the multiple ironies that run through the text as a whole work to underscore that the "conundrums [posed by her lectures] have no rational solution," but instead "require . . . a leap of imaginative faith" (713)— the kind of leap that, as Elizabeth eventually goes on to argue, only fiction and poetry can help us make.

According to Elizabeth, the unique power of literary aesthetics as a vehicle for interspecies translation lies primarily in literature's ability to engage our *embodied and affective*, and not just rational, faculties. Challenging Descartes' privileging of rational thinking over embodied experience, she insists upon the importance of embodied knowledge —that is, the kind of knowledge we derive from the "heavily affective sensation . . . of being a body with limbs that have extension in space"—and asserts that literature has a unique ability to mobilize our embodied faculties to help us imagine what it might be like to inhabit "the being of another" (Coetzee 35). Thus, echoing Haraway's sense that forging an ethics that respects animals' significant otherness demands a more careful attention to the "material-semiotic" interactions through which humans and animals construct common worlds, Elizabeth argues for an aesthetics of embodied relation that draws our attention to the material and affective processes that are mobilized when we encounter animal others. Thus, she maintains that, instead of "try[ing] to find an idea in the animal," literature should function as "a record of *an engagement with him*" (51 emphasis mine). Curiously, this kind of record remains conspicuously absent from Coetzee's text: indeed, as the primatologist Barbara Smuts notes, "in a story that is, ostensibly, about our relations with members of other species, none of the characters ever mentions a personal encounter with an animal"—an elision that constitutes a "striking gap in the discourse on animal rights" contained in the novel (107, 108). Smuts refuses to speculate on the reasons behind this elision, but I would posit that the conspicuous absence of human–animal interactions within the text serves to underscore that a genuinely posthuman aesthetics cannot function through irony and indirectness alone but must instead combine its ironic awareness of the dangers of anthropocentrism with a willingness to imagine what it might be like to "share . . . the being of another," to borrow the expression used by Elizabeth in the novel (Coetzee 34).

A similar tension can be registered in Atwood's *Surfacing* and Engel's *Bear.* Although both novels rely on narrative irony as their primary aesthetic mode, they ultimately point to the necessity of moving beyond this stance of ironic awareness to construct an aesthetic that mobilizes the affective power of literature to help us imagine—

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if only momentarily—the inner world of those animal beings whose phenomenology is radically different from our own. While this kind of sympathetic engagement remains ironically absent from Coetzee's text, it is briefly enacted in those aforementioned scenes from *Surfacing* and *Bear* in which Atwood's nameless narrator encounters the reticent gaze of the blue jays, and in which Bear responds to Lou's sexual advances by striking her violently. In both instances, the human protagonists are dislodged from their position as self-contained subjects and enter into a relational dance (in Haraway's sense of the expression) in which they are forced to recognize their respective animal counterparts as significant others who have a unique experience of being in the world but nevertheless share our condition as embodied beings who are entitled to our ethical consideration and intersubjective attention. Even though these moments are fleeting, and ultimately collapse under the weight of both protagonists' persistently anthropocentric habits of mind, they evince an aesthetics of embodied relation that anticipates more recent efforts, by writers like the Canadian ecopoet Don MacKay, to construct a posthumanist aesthetics that attends to the cultural and political investments that shape our perception of animals while also mobilizing our sympathetic faculties to imagine an animal's experience of being in the world, if only momentarily. This aesthetic vision is powerfully enacted in MacKay's poem “Load,” which meditates on the speaker's encounter with a “White-throated sparrow” he “met” “one morning/ on the beach at Point Pelee” (168). The speaker observes that the sparrow was “just huddled into itself” and speculates the bird must have been recovering after flying across Lake Eerie to get to Point Pelee (168). In the lines that follow, he goes on to visualize the different muscles and bones that the bird must have employed to complete its exhausting flight:

> I was thinking of the muscles in that grey-white breast;
> pectoralis major powering each downstroke,
> pectoralis minor with its rope and pulley tendon
> reaching through the shoulder to the
> top side of the humerus to haul it up again . . . (168)

Crucially, all of the anatomical structures that the speaker mentions constitute what evolutionary biologists would refer to as “homologous structures,” or structures that have evolved from a common ancestor and thus stand as evidence of a shared evolutionary heritage across different species. Thus, as other critics have already noted, McKay's poetics combine metaphor with the principle of homology to suggest a deeply embodied affinity between human beings and birds.[3] In “Load,” this affinity enables the speaker to imagine, for a brief

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moment, the physical feat that the sparrow had to perform in order to reach its destination. Implicit in this moment of embodied identification is a poignant recognition of the evolutionary struggle shared by all living creatures—that is, the common "load" that the title of the poem refers to. Moved by this affinity, the speaker is momentarily tempted to reach out and stroke the sparrow, but, "recalling several terrors of [his own] brief existence," he stops himself, presumably because he recognizes that touching the sparrow would constitute both a physical invasion, and a symbolic denial of the creature's significant otherness (McKay 169). Through this final gesture of restraint, the poem affirms the possibility of respecting animals' divergent agency while also employing the power of the literary imagination to imagine what this agency might look like.

The complex ironies at work in *Surfacing* and *Bear* raise important questions not only about the aesthetic challenges posed by interspecies translation but also about the relationship between animal studies and postcolonial studies. By scrutinizing the Canadian literary imagination's investment in animal others as vehicles for indigenization, these novels highlight the intersections, and also the tensions, that exist between these two related fields of study. Indeed, these texts' shared condemnation of the narrative impulse to incorporate the animal other in order to become "of" the land serves to underscore that Canadian cultural constructions of animal others are bound up with a settler-colonial project that hinges on erasing indigenous peoples and indigenous land claims. However, while both novels provide a strong corrective against the instrumentalization of animal others, their critique of settler colonialism remains incomplete since neither takes up the question of how to redress the ongoing displacement and dispossession of Canada's First Nations. In fact, it is important to note here that neither of these novels acknowledges indigenous peoples as speaking subjects in their own right; instead, they both figure indigenous peoples as spectral entities who disrupt settler-colonial claims only negatively—through their persistent, albeit dwindling presence on the land. In *Surfacing*, the "darkfaced" children who haunt the narrator's memories appear only momentarily, as vague reminders of those indigenous "others" who used to frequent the narrator's home territory many years ago, but have long since departed (Atwood 9, 88). Meanwhile, in *Bear,* Lucy—the indigenous woman who tacitly authorizes Lou's presence in Pennarth by gifting her with knowledge about Bear—is depicted as a "withered" alcoholic whose abrupt departure from Pennarth seems to anticipate the imminent disappearance of the region's indigenous inhabitants (Engel 48). Indeed, following her departure, Lou describes her in terms that explicitly cast her as a "vanishing" indigene: "Lucy

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was gone, that was all, a hundred years old, gleaming, toothless, and gone," she tells us (49). Ironically, then, while both novels depict animals as significant others who not only exceed but, in some cases, actively resist their instrumentalization as vehicles for indigenization, they continue to consign indigenous peoples to an economy of representation in which they figure only as empty signifiers for stereotypical notions of the "vanishing" indigene. Viewed at the meta level of the relationship between animal studies and postcolonial studies, this contradiction serves to highlight that animal rights activists and animal studies scholars need to remain vigilant of the wider historical and socio-political contexts in which animal rights debates take place so as to avoid the risk of imposing Western liberal ethical standards on indigenous and "Third World" communities or, even worse, disenfranchizing such communities even further. As Huggan notes in his own consideration of the relationship between ecocriticism and postcolonial studies, working at the intersection of these fields demands "constant critical attention" to "questions of who speaks for whom . . . particularly in cases where "othering" is the inadvertent result of an act of well-intended political advocacy, or where the attempt to reach out to one oppressed group runs the risk of further marginalizing another" (720). The problematic representation of indigenous peoples in *Surfacing* and *Bear* serves to underscore that animal studies scholars not only need to pay closer attention to questions of cross-cultural "othering" and subalternization but also need to make themselves more accountable to indigenous perspectives and indigenous epistemologies, especially when working in a Canadian cultural context that has been profoundly shaped by settler-invader constructions of animals as vehicles of indigenization.

Notes

1. However, as Fiamengo argues, the narrator's lingering guilt over her abortion could be read as a displaced expression of her latent "postcolonial guilt" as a settler-invader who has particpated in the "inadvertent occupation of conquered land" ("Postcolonial Guilt" 141–142).

2. As Christl Verduyn explains, *Bear* was originally linked to a fund-raising project that was initiated by the Writers' Union, and which sought to "raise funds for the impoverished [organization] through an anthology of erotic tales contributed by the members" (119). For a more detailed discussion of the residual pornographic elements in *Bear,* see Carol Ann Howells's "Marian Engel's 'Bear': Pastoral, Porn, and Myth."

3. See, for instance, Susan Fisher's "'Ontological Applause': Metaphor and Homology in the Poetry of Don Mackay" and Travis Mason's discussion of

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homology in *Ornithologies of Desire: Ecocritical Essays, Avian Poetics, and Don McKay* (58–59).

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